
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SOVIET AEROSPACE 19 November 1979



FORMER CIA ANALYST WARNS OF SOVIET SALT II DECEPTION

Says SS 18 Capability Can Be Expanded Under Treaty

A former analyst of Soviet strategic military affairs in the Central Intelligence Agency Wednesday said the Soviet Union can deceptively test the SS-18's capability to carry more than 10 warheads under the SALT II Treaty, as part of an overall Soviet program of concealment and physical camouflage involving "all their strategic forces."

David S. Sullivan, a military affairs assistant to Sen. Gordon Humphrey (R-N.H.), said the Soviets can, by testing various payload combinations on different flight tests, develop the capability to deploy more than the 10 MIRV warheads allowed under SALT II.

The Soviet late last year tested a 12-14 payload dispensing capability with the SS-18 post-boost vehicle. And, on April 26, an encoded overland flight of the SS-18 demonstrated the capability to dispense 20 packages from the post-boost vehicle.

Sullivan, at a news conference held by the Coalition for Peace Through Strength, stressing that his analysis is based upon "a highly classified CIA study," warned that as a result of Soviet negotiating deception in SALT II, Soviet strategic programs are being developed and "will soon be tested using physical camouflage and telemetry encryption to conceal their vital characteristics.

"If the past is any guide to the future," Sullivan continued, "it will take the U.S. at least 5 years to discover that we have again been deceived by the Soviets in SALT II, just as it took us 5 years to belatedly discover that we had been deceived in SALT I."

SALT I Deception

The former CIA analyst said the Soviets in 1972 negotiated deceptively "on all of the important issues of SALT I in order to allow their new ICBM and SLBM programs to escape constraint under SALT I." Sullivan cited:

- * Soviet "false statements" about the size of their new large, heavy SS-19 ICBM; "false statements" that the SS-19 could be banned, "despite their then secret plans to deploy it widely;" repeated Soviet "false statements" that the U.S. already knew about the characteristics of new Soviet ICBMs;
- * Soviet "false claim" to having 48 submarines operational or under construction in May 1972, carrying 768 SLBMs (Sullivan says Soviets now have 65 "countable" SLBM subs in violation of SALT I's 62-sub limit);
- * Soviet "falacious" geographical asymmetry argument allowing them a huge superiority over the U.S. in SLBMs;
- * "False Soviet pledge" not to build mobile ICBMs, and the false Soviet statement that they did not have an ongoing mobile ICBM program (Sullivan says the Soviets now have a stockpile of over 100 mobile ICBMs);
- * "False Soviet claim" that SALT I avoided a new arms race and contained no Soviet unilateral advantages;
- * "The massive, expanding Soviet nationwide camouflage, concealment, and deception program involving all their strategic forces. This physical camouflage and deception was harnessed to negotiating deception, and its expansion during the years of SALT I represented a circumvention of SALT I's ban on deliberate concealment."

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